25. EXTREME STRUCTURE-BOUND MANNER OF EXPERIENCING (PSYCHOSES, DREAMS, HYPNOSIS, CO2, LSD, STIMULUS DEPRIVATION).
25.極端結構限制的體驗方式（精神病，夢，催眠，二氧化碳，迷幻藥，刺激剝奪）。
Throughout, we have been discussing the felt, implicit functioning of the interaction process we term "experiencing." We have been pointing out that all appropriate behavior and interpretations of present situations depend on this felt functioning. It constitutes the thousands of meanings and past experiences which determine appropriate present behavior. In addition, it is this felt functioning to which we can respond ourselves, and this is the self-process. The functioning I am discussing is felt, meaning that we can refer to it ourselves. For example, as we read this page the words are sound images for us. These sound images are all we explicitly have in mind. However, we also have the meanings of the sound images. How? We do not say to ourselves what it all means. We feel the meanings of what we read as we go along. They function implicitly. This feeling process is an interaction between the symbols on the page and our feeling. This felt interaction process is now ongoing and gives us appropriate feelings and meanings.
我們已經討論了互動過程中感受到的，暗在的功能，我們定義為“體驗過程”（experiencing）。我們已經指出了所有對當下情況的合適的行為與解釋都依賴於感受功能。這由許許多多的意義及過去的體驗組成，並決定了合適的當下行為。通過感受功能我們可以回應自己，這就是自我過程。我這裏討論的功能是感受（felt），指我們可以和自己關聯。比如說，當我在讀這一頁文字的時候，這些詞語對我們來說是聲音的表像。這些聲音的表像是明在地存在於我們頭腦中的。然而，我們還有這些聲音表像的意義。這是怎樣的呢？我們並不對自己說話。當我們在閱讀的時候，我們感受到這些意義。他們暗在地運作。這種感受過程是我們感受和這一頁的象徵符號之間的互動。這種感受到的互動過程正在工作，給了我們合適的感受和意義。
When the interaction process is greatly curtailed (as in sleep, hypnosis, psychosis, 26，and isolation experiments), the inwardly felt experiencing is thereby curtailed. The individual then lacks the implicit function of felt experiencing and loses both his sense of "self" and his capacity to respond to and interpret present events appropriately. Both require the felt process just illustrated.
當互動過程很大程度被縮減時（睡眠，催眠，精神病，實驗性的隔離），這種內在體驗過程因此減少了。個體缺少了感受體驗過程的暗在功能，因此失去了他的自我感，以及適切回應並解釋當下事件的能力。這兩者都要求感受過程來進行闡明。
The peculiar phenomena which occur under these circumstances are somewhat more understandable when they are considered in terms of curtailment or stoppage of the interaction process and implicit function of felt experiencing.
如果我們從互動過程及感受體驗的暗在功能的縮減和阻斷這一方面來思考以下這些特殊現象時，就更好理解了。
I would like now to state some of the characteristics of this (hallucinatory or dreamlike) extreme structure-bound manner of experiencing.
我現在來陳述一下極端的結構限制的體驗方式（幻覺，具有夢特性的狀態）的一些特點。
Structures Are Perceived as Such. Ordinarily, past experiences and learnings function implicitly in felt experiencing, so that we interpret and perceive the present, not the past experiences themselves. Yet under hypnosis, in dreams, and in hallucinations, we may perceive rigid structures and past events as such. Characteristically, we do not then have the relevant aspects of felt process which usually function. Thus hallucinations and dreams are not understandable to the present individual. He is puzzled or aghast at them. They often seem to him "not his." The felt experiencing that would give him a sense of their being "his," and would let him know their meaning, is not ongoing. Dreams and hallucinations are, so to speak, decomposed pieces of what would otherwise be a functioning, felt process. This interaction process with the present is not ongoing, and hence the felt meanings are not functioning.
對結構的知覺的方式。通常，過去體驗和學習是在感受體驗過程中暗在地發揮功能，所以我們可以解釋和理解當下，而不是過去體驗本身。然而在催眠狀態下，在夢裏，在幻覺中我們對這些僵硬的結構和過去事件的知覺方式會呈現出以下所述的特點。其特性是失去了感受過程中通常發揮功能的一些方面。幻覺和夢對於個體來說不再可以理解。個體對此迷惑且驚駭。對於個體來說這好像並不是他自己。能夠帶來“屬於他的”(being “his”)這種感覺及幫助他理解其意義的感受過程停止進行了。夢和幻覺可以說分解了本應發揮功能的感受過程。這一和當下互動的過程並沒有在進行，因此感受意義也不再發揮功能。
Let me now trace through these several different kinds of circumstances how in each the interaction process is first curtailed, and how in each the function of felt experiencing is then missing.
讓我們來探索這些不同種類的情況，在每種情況中互動過程是如何被縮減的，以及感受體驗過程的功能為何缺少了。
Extreme Structure-Bound Manner Occurs Whenever the Interaction Process is Greatly Curtailed. Dreams, hypnosis, psychosis, C02 and LSD, and stimulus deprivation share at least one factor, the curtailment of ongoing interaction.
只要當互動過程被嚴重減少，極端結構限定方式便會發生。夢、催眠、精神病、二氧化碳和迷幻藥，刺激剝奪這裏有一個共同的元素，正在進行的互動的減少。
In sleep there is a great reduction of external stimuli. Dreams occur with this curtailment of the usually ongoing interaction process with the environment.
在睡眠中有一個很大的外部刺激的減少。當通常和外部環境進行的互動過程減少時，夢就產生了。
In hypnosis, too, the subject must shut off his interaction with present stimuli, and must cease his own self-responsiveness. He must concentrate on a point.
在催眠中也是，主體關閉了對現在刺激的互動，必須停止他自己的自我回應。他必須專注於一個點。
Psychosis, as has often been remarked (for example, Shlien, 1960), involves both in its genesis and later, an "isolation," a curtailment of interaction between feeling and events. Also, physical isolation from people can, in some individuals, bring on hallucinations.
精神病，經常提及到的一點(比如 Shlien, 1960)，不管是最初發病時還是之後，都存在“隔離”，感受和事件之間互動的減少。和其他人物理上的隔離會讓一些個體產生幻覺。
Certain poisons (C02, LSD) are inimical to the physiological interaction process of body life. C02 narrows (and eventually stops) the process of respiration.
一些有毒物質（二氧化碳，迷幻藥）對身體生命的生理互動過程有害。二氧化碳限制（最終會終止）呼吸過程。
Experiments in which individuals are placed in soundproof and lightproof suits that also prevent touch stimuli result (after a few hours) in psychotic-like hallucinations.
在隔音、隔光的房間裏對個體做的實驗，並且阻斷觸覺刺激，幾個小時後會帶來類似精神病樣的幻覺。
The peculiarly similar experiences which arise under these widely different conditions hint at something similar. At least one factor they all share is the curtailment of the ongoing interaction process which, as felt, is experiencing. We would thus expect a lack of the implicit functioning which ongoing experiencing usually provides. 27，
這些發生在不同條件下的類似的刺激實驗指向一個相似的東西。至少有一個共同因素，進行的互動過程——感受到的體驗過程——的減少。我們可以認為這些情況下缺少進行的體驗過程，而這通常提供暗在功能。
And indeed this is shared by the phenomena which occur in all these circumstances. The peculiar character of these phenomena is understandable as a rigidity or lack of this felt functioning which usually interprets every present situation for us, and to which we respond in self-process. Thus appropriate interpreting of situations and sense of self are lost.
在所有這些情況下，這些現象都具有這一特點。這一特性可以從感受功能的僵化和缺乏的角度來理解，通常，感受功能解釋每一個當下的情境，我們通過自我過程來進行回應。因此對情況適切的解釋及自我感喪失了。
Lack of Implicit Function. The implicit function (see definition 4) of felt experiencing becomes rigid (not in process) or "literal" in all these conditions. In hypnosis, for example, when the individual is told to "raise your hand," he will lift the palm of his hand up by his wrist. He will not, as when awake, interpret the idiomatic phrase appropriately (it means, of course, to raise one's whole arm up into the air). The same "literal" quality occurs in dreams and in psychosis. Much of what has been called "primary process," "schizophrenic thinking," or the schizophrenic's inability to "abstract" his "concrete" thinking, his "taking the part for the whole" (Goldstein, 1954), really consists of this literal and rigid manner in which experiencing functions. As in dreams and hypnosis, the felt process of experiencing is curtailed and does not provide its implicit functioning.
暗在功能的缺乏。在這些情況下，感受體驗的暗在功能（定義4）變得僵化（不處於過程中）或變得“文字化”。比如說在催眠狀態下，當個體被告知“舉起你的手”，他會將手腕以上的手掌翻轉過來。他不會像覺醒的時候按照語言習慣正確地理解（指舉起整個手臂）。同樣的“語言化的”特徵也會發生在夢裏，或精神病的狀態下。這些被稱為“初級過程”，“精神分裂性思考”，或是精神病性的無法“抽象”其“具體”的思考，或是“用部分取代整體”(Goldstein，1954)實際上是由於體驗功能中這種語言化和僵硬的方式造成的。就像在夢中和催眠狀態下，體驗的感受過程被減少了，無法提供暗在的功能。
The many implicit felt meanings that are needed for appropriate interpretations and reactions do not function, since the felt process (of which they are process aspects) is not ongoing. That is exactly what "literal" means: the lack of functioning of other meanings which should inform our interpretation of a given set of words or events.
因為感受過程（過程方面）不在進行，適宜的解釋和反應所需的許多暗在的感受意義無法發揮功能。這便是“語言化”的含義：缺乏其他意義的功能以便我們解釋一組詞語或事件。
"Loss of Self." Another characteristic shared by dreams, hypnosis, psychosis, and the phenomena obtained in stimulus-deprivation and LSD, is the loss of a sense of self. In dreams what we perceive is beyond the control, interpretation, ownership, of the self (or ego). In hypnosis the individual specifically accepts another's suggestions for his own and totally permits them to replace his own self-responding. And in psychosis so often the patient complains: "I didn't do that. Something made me do it"; or "I'm not myself"; or "These voices are not mine"; or, "Inside me I'm nothing at all." The hallucinations, voices, and things in his head are not felt to be his own. He lacks the sense of self. If he does have a sense of self (an "intact ego"), this felt sense does not inform the hallucinatory phenomena. In regard to these, he has no sense of self that implicitly contains their meaning.
“自我的喪失”。夢、催眠、精神病、刺激剝奪、迷幻藥這些現象的另外一個共同的特點便是自我感的喪失。在夢中，我們所知覺的超出了自我（Self或Ego）的掌控、解釋與身份感。在催眠中個體只接受另外一個人的建議，完全讓他人取代了自己的自我回應。精神病狀態下的病人經常抱怨：“那不是我做的，是有一些東西東西讓我做的”；或是“我不是我自己”；或是“這些不是我的聲音”；或是“我的心裏面什麼都沒有”。幻覺、聲音、他頭腦中的東西不再感受為自己的。他缺少自我感。如果他確實有自我感（完整的Ego），這種感受不會形成幻覺。從這些方面來看，他沒有自我感以便暗在地理解其意義。
This loss of self is due to the missing felt functioning of experiencing. Just as outward events (to the extent of psychosis) are not interpreted and interacted with on the basis of felt experiencing, so also this felt experiencing ii missing for self-responses.
由於體驗的感受功能的缺乏，自我喪失了。而外部事件（精神病的情況）缺乏感受體驗過程，也無法得到解釋與互動，而由於同樣的原因，自我回應也無法進行。
We have defined the self as self-process. The self exists to the extent that the individual can carry his felt process forward by means of his own symbols, behaviors, or attention. Experiments with stimulus deprivation have found that individuals who develop psychosis more slowly have a greater capacity to respond 28，to themselves (the most "imagination" and "creativity;" it was called). The finding would corroborate our views since, to the extent the individual can carry forward his own experiencing, he will be maintaining (by symbols and attention) his interaction process. When the interaction process is greatly narrowed, not only do psychotic-like experiences occur, but the sense of "self" is lost. The felt process to which there can be self-response becomes static and the individual has unowned perceptions.
我們已經把自我定義為自我過程。如果個體能夠使用自己的符號、行為和注意力帶動自己感受過程，自我便是存在的。刺激剝奪試驗發現在試驗中較慢發展出精神病症狀的個體回應自己的能力更強（被稱為“想像力”和“創造力”）。這一發現驗證了我們的觀點，某種意義上，如果個體能夠帶動他自己的體驗，那他也能夠（通過象徵和注意力）維持自己的互動過程。當互動過程被限制時，不僅類精神病性的體驗發生，自我感也會喪失。自我回應與之互動的感受過程變得靜止，個體的知覺也失去了身體感。
Static, Repetitious, Unmodifiable Manner. Insofar as the implicit function of felt experiencing is rigid, there is no way for present situations to interact with it, and to modify it so that it becomes an interpretation of the present situation. Instead we perceive a repetitious pattern that is not modified by the present situation. The sequence may "go off" as a result of being "cued" by present events, but it is not an interpretation of, or response to, present events.
靜止的、重複的和無法改變的方式。如果感受過程的暗在功能是僵化的，當下的情況便無法與之互動，並按照對現在情況的解釋來改變它。相反，我們知覺到一個並不被現在情況所改變的重複的模式。這個序列可能會由於現在事件的提示而消失，但並不是對現在事件的解釋或回應。
The Universality of Psychotic "Contents." Experiences in the extreme structure-bound manner are not process aspects. They occur precisely to the extent that the felt process is not ongoing. It is striking how certain themes universally recur-usually the familiar "oral, anal, and genital" themes. It seems that this is the stuff of which we are all composed . . . and into which the usually ongoing process decomposes, insofar as it is not ongoing.
精神病“內容”的普遍性。極端體驗限制方式的體驗不是過程的方面。這些現象和感受過程無法進行緊密關連。非常引人注意的一點是，特定的主題普遍地重現——通常是熟悉的“口欲期，肛門期和生殖期”主題。看起來我們都是由這些東西組成的。也通常通過進行中的過程將它們解構，直到它們進程停止。
Psychotic Experiences Are Not "the Repressed." It is fallacious to consider these structure-bound manifestations as repressed experiences which have now "emerged" or "erupted." To so consider them raises the puzzling question: On the one hand many theories hold that adjustment requires awareness, and that repression makes maladjustment, but on the other hand they hold that the psychotic is "too aware" and needs to "rerepress" all these experiences.
精神病性的體驗並不是“潛抑的內容”。將這些結構限制的展現物看成是潛抑體驗的顯現和迸發會帶來一些誤解。有兩點疑問：一方面許多理論認為調整需要覺知，潛抑帶來不適應，另外一方面他們又認為精神病性的問題是“太過覺知了”，這些體驗又需要潛抑。
A better formulation, I think, would be to interpret this observation as follows: Optimally these universal past experiences function implicitly in felt experiencing. When that ongoing process ceases, decomposed static patterns occupy the center of the sensorium.
我認為以下對觀察的解釋更為合理：理想情況下，這些普遍的過去體驗應該在感受體驗中暗在地發揮功能。當正在進行的過程停止，解體的靜態的模式便佔據了感覺中樞的中心。
The implications of this reformulation can be seen, for example, in the following. "The psychosis," in this view, is not these supposedly underlying contents (in that sense everyone is "psychotic"). Rather, "the psychosis" is the curtailment or cessation of the interaction process of feeling and events. When, therefore, we label an individual "borderline psychotic," this does not mean that certain dangerous contents lie down there in him. Rather, he is "isolated," "uninvolved," "not quite there," "withdrawn," or "out of touch with himself"; i.e., his manner of experiencing is highly structure bound. To prevent "the psychosis" from occurring, one must respond as much as possible to such feelings as do implicitly function, so as to carry forward and reconstitute ongoing interaction and experiencing.
這一重述的內涵是，比如說，當我們用這種觀點來看待“精神病”，其實並非是假定潛在的一些內容（這樣看的話每個人都是“精神病性”的）。精神病其實是感受與事件的互動過程的縮減與停止。而當我們給一個人貼上“邊緣性精神病”標籤的時候，這並不是說某種危險的內容潛藏在他的內心世界中。實際上，他是“隔離的”，“不捲入的”，“好象不在那兒”，“退縮的”，“和自己失去接觸的”，也就是說，他的體驗方式是高結構限制的。為了預防“精神病”的發作，一個人應該儘量對感受及暗在功能進行回應，以便帶動和重建正在進行的互動和體驗過程。
The view of "latent psychotic contents" leads to two dangerous errors: either one decides that the individual's feelings of difficulty and trouble had better be ignored (lest they "blossom into" full psychosis), or one "interprets" them and "digs" them "out." Either decision denies and pushes away the personal interaction and the individual's implicitly functioning feelings. Either decision will result in psychosis-they involve the same self verifying misconception that "contents" are psychotic.
“潛在精神病性內容”的觀點會導致兩個危險的錯誤：第一，會認為個體困難和麻煩的感受最好被忽視（唯恐他們發展成為完整的精神病），或是進行“詮釋”並將他們“挖掘”出來。這兩個決定都否定並推開了人際互動以及個體的暗在運作的感受。每一個決定都會導致精神病——結果會讓他們驗證自己錯誤的理解：那些“內容”是精神病性的。
There is nothing "psychotic" about any "underlying contents." What is psychotic is the structure-bound manner of experiencing, the absence or literal rigidity of felt experiencing and interaction.
關於“潛在的內容”並沒有什麼“精神病性”。精神病性的是結構限制的體驗方式，感受體驗與互動的缺乏，或是語言僵化性。
Whether "borderline" or seemingly "gone," the person will "come alive" if interaction and experiencing [25] is reconstituted by personal responses which carry forward what does still function .[26]
無論是“邊緣的”或是看起來“無望的”，只要對個體仍有功能的部分進行適切的人際回應，並重建互動與體驗過程[25]，這個個體便又會“活了起來”。 [26]
26. CONTENT MUTATION.
26．內容轉變。
As implicitly functioning felt meanings are carried forward and the process is reconstituted and made more immediate in manner, there is a constant change in "content." As referent movement occurs, both symbolization and direct referent change. There is a sequence of successive "contents." Sometimes these successive 29，contents are said to "emerge" as if they had always been there, or as if the final basic content is now finally revealed. But I prefer to call this content mutation. It is not a change only in how one interprets but, rather a change both in feeling and in symbols. The contents change because the process is being newly completed and reconstituted by responses. What the contents will be depends greatly on the responses.
當暗在運作的感受意義被帶動，過程被重建並在方式上更為直接時，在內容上便會發生持續的改變。當指涉運動發生時，象徵和直接指涉物都發生了改變。這裏有一個連續的“內容”的序列。有的時候，這些序列被表述為就像本來就一直在那，現在浮現了出來，就好像基礎的內容現在終於被揭示了出來。但我更傾向於稱之為內容轉變。這並不是一個人如何解釋的變化，而是在感受及象徵上都發生了變化。內容的變化是由於這個過程通過回應現在得到完結並得以重建。新的內容是什麼在很大程度上受到回應的影響。
An example of content mutation has already been given (definitions 8-9). Here are more examples of content mutation:
The client is in terror. She says there will be "doom." The world will fly to pieces. Something awful will happen. There is a monster.
之前已經有一個關於內容轉變的例子（定義8-9）。這兒再舉一些有關內容轉變的例子：
來訪者處於恐怖中。她說會有一個“末日”。世界會崩潰為碎片。一些很可怕的事情將要發生。那兒有個怪物。
Here is "the psychosis" someone might say. At any rate, a common enough psychotic content.
可能會有人說，這是“精神病”。最起碼是一個精神病性的內容。
She is awfully afraid, she says. I respond that she is afraid and that I want to keep company and be with her, since she is afraid. She repeats that she is afraid. No matter how much or little meaningful symbology there is to the "doom," she is afraid now.
她說她非常害怕。我回應說她很害怕，我想陪她一起，我會在那裏。她重複說她很害怕。不管關於“末日”是否有什麼意義，她現在害怕。
Minutes or months later she can say:
"I'm afraid of being lost. I'm lost. I'm so lost!"
幾分鐘或幾個月以後她可以說：
“我害怕不知所措。我是如此的不知所措。”
"For years I have had to know exactly what to do every moment. I'd plan to know exactly what to do so I'd be distracted. It's like blinders. I'd be afraid to look up, sort of. I need someone or something to hold on to, or I'll disappear."
“許多年來，我都必須知道每個時刻該做什麼，我會計畫每個時刻要做什麼，否則就會很心煩意亂。就像是瞎子。我很害怕要去找尋，就好像我需要依靠某個人或某些事。否則我就會消失”。
This is more understandable than world doom. The content seems now to be "objectloss" or "passive-dependent needs." Whatever it is, the response needed must provide contact: I grasp her hand; or I talk gently, saying something, pertinent or not-something from me to maintain contact and not to talk away the fear of being lost. In terms of process unity such talking and such touching are really the same, in that they both reestablish interaction. To do so it must be personal and it must convert the need to "hold on" into a successfully ongoing contact, real or symbolic.
這就比世界末日好理解多了。內容看上去是“客體失落”或是“被動——依賴需求”。不管是什麼，回應應該提供聯結。我抓住她的手，或是溫柔地談話，說點什麼，相關或不相關的——去保持聯結，而不是用談話來趕走對不知所措的恐懼。根據過程整體這一觀點，這種談話和接觸其實是一樣的，都是重新建立互動。必須以個人的方式這樣去做，必須要將去依靠的需要轉移到一個正在進行的聯結上，可以是真實，也可以使符號的。
"I need to hold on, but I'm a monster. No one can love me. You must be sick of me. I need so much, all I do is need.: I'm just selfish and evil. I'll suck you dry if I can. I'm just a horrible mouth."
“我需要去依靠，但我是一個怪物，沒人能愛我。你肯定很厭惡我。我是如此需要，我所做都只是需要。我就是自私而且邪惡。如果我可以的話我會把你吸幹。我就是一張可怕的嘴。”
Oral needs, oral incorporation, are now the contents that might be proposed.
可能有人會認為這些是口欲期需求，或是口欲融合。
But her need does feel endless, infinite, hungry. "Sure," I say, "It feels endless, bottomless, and awful to you. It's like you want to be fed and held forever."
但是她的需求感覺上是無止盡的，無限的，饑渴的。“當然了”，我說，“它感覺上沒有止盡，沒有底，對你來說很恐怖。就好像你想要永遠被餵養被抱著。”
Then, or some other time, she may say: "I'm just a baby. I hate that child. An ugly child. I was an ugly child. Nobody could like me the way I am."
然後，或是改天，她可能說：“我只是一個小嬰兒。我恨這個小孩。一個醜陋的小孩。我是一個醜陋的小孩。沒人喜歡我的樣子。”
But we have come a long way when the monster is now a child! A child is quite a nice thing. What became of the monster? A child is quite a human, every day, daylight thing. What became of the terror? The psychosis?
但是我們到了這裏，怪物現在成了一個小孩！小孩是很美好的。是什麼成了怪物。小孩是一個人，日常的，光明的啊。是什麼產生了恐怖？精神病？
Such content mutation can occur within a few minutes or over months. It may occur in such words and symbols as above or in purely socially acceptable language, or with bizarre incoherent words, or in silence. The point I am trying to make is that the 30，content changes as one responds and thereby carries forward and reconstitutes an interaction process. Such interaction constitutes felt experiencing, and contents are always aspects thereof. As the process changes, the contents change. I term it content mutation.
這樣的內容轉變也許只要幾分鐘，也可能要花上幾個月。它可能就在上面的這樣幾個詞語或是符號之後發生，也可能就發生在社會可以接受的語言之中，也有可能發生非常怪異的不連續的語詞或是沉默中。我想要強調的重點是伴隨著回應，內容轉變會發生，並能夠帶動和重建互動過程。這樣的互動產生了感受體驗過程，而內容則總是其中的方面。當過程改變，內容也就改變了。我將這定義為內容轉變。
Content mutation occurs strikingly with so-called "psychotic contents." The monsters, weird fears, infinite hungers, and doom-expectant terrors are so often aspects of isolation, loss of self and interaction. They are not psychotic "things" in a person, but a narrowed or stopped interaction process. As the interaction process is restored the contents change and, also, they become more understandable and commonly human.
所謂的“精神病性的內容”的轉變吸引人的注意。怪物，奇怪的害怕，無限的饑餓，末日性的恐懼經常是隔離的方面，自我和互動的喪失。他們並不是某種在人體內的精神病性的“東西”(thing)，而是被縮小或阻斷的互動過程。當互動過程被重建，內容便開始變化，他們便更容易理解，成為一般的人類。
But content mutation occurs not only with quite dramatic expressions, such as in the above example. It occurs equally with the often silent, unexpressive, and "unmotivated" individuals with whom we have so largely been working in the current research on psychotherapy with schizophrenics (Rogers et al., 1961; Gendlin, 1961b, 1962a, 1962c), although these individuals often conceptualize so little of what they are feeling. The following is a further example of content mutation:
An individual talks about a chain of circumstances which disturb him. Numerous patterns, characteristics, and personality "contents," seem noticeable in his report of these circumstances.
內容並不總像上述例子中伴隨著戲劇化的表達。在比較沉默的，不太表達，以及“動機不明”的個體——我們曾大量做過的對精神分裂症的心理治療的那些個體——也一樣會發生(Rogers et al., 1961; Gendlin, 1961b, 1962a, 1962c)。雖然這些個體對他們感受的概念化非常少。下面是另外一個內容轉變的例子：
這一個體討論到一系列的情況會讓他煩惱。他關於這些情況的彙報中有許多的模式，特性和人格“內容”吸引我們的注意。
Perhaps with the aid of responses, he goes on to find that this chain of circumstances really makes him very angry. That's it! He is furious. He wishes he could harm and destroy the people involved. He is afraid he will attack them when he next sees them. He hopes he will be able to control this destructive desire. He is amazed at his own hostility and his own fear of it. He hardly needs further to report the circumstances, so deeply true is his experience of this anger and destructive need. Again, now,' we are tempted to consider personality "contents." Our first deductions now seem too broad. Here, really, we have some contents of this man's personality. We are familiar with this fear of one's own hostility and what some of the bases of the hostility probably are.
也許是回應帶來的幫助，他繼續前進，進而發現這一系列的情況讓他非常生氣。是的。他非常地暴怒。他希望他能夠傷害並摧毀相關的人。他害怕下次見到他們的時候會攻擊他們。他希望他能夠控制這種毀滅的欲望。他非常驚訝於自己的敵意及自己對此的恐懼。他幾乎不需要繼續彙報各種情況，而他對憤怒和毀滅的欲望是十分深刻且真實的。所以，再一次，我們需要思考人格“內容”。我們最初的推論現在看起來太寬泛了。在這，我們有一些這個人人格的內容。我們很熟悉對自己敵意的恐懼，以及一些敵意的基礎可能是些什麼。
But let us say the man continues (and I continue to respond to his felt meanings). He imagines himself attempting to vent his anger at these people. He finds now that he is not afraid he will uncontrollably attack and harm them. It is more likely (of all things!) that he will not be able even to yell at them, because perhaps he will cry. His voice would choke up, he is sure. In fact, it is somewhat choked up right now. This thing is not really hostility, it now appears. It is rather that he feels so hurt! They should not have done this to him! They hurt him, and . . . what can he do? And now he feels, with some relief, that he finally is in touch with what all this really means to him. (We may now propose a third group of personality contents, again different.)
不過，這個人又繼續下去（而我繼續對他感受意義進行回應）。他想像他自己試圖對這些人發洩自己的憤怒。他發現現在他不害怕自己不能控制去襲擊並傷害他們。更像是他甚至無法對他們喊叫，因為也許他會哭。他的嗓音會哽咽，他確信這一點。實際上，現在就有些哽咽了。現在看起來根本不是敵意。而是他覺得如此受傷。他們不應該對他這樣！他們傷害了他，而且……他能做什麼？帶著一些釋放，他現在感覺，他終於和這些東西對他真正的意義在一起了。（我們現在也許會提出第三組人格內容，又不同了。）
But, as he continues, it turns out that the circumstances as such do not really matter. No wonder! It seemed all along quite a petty thing to be so upset about. The content is really something else and that is what hurts. And he finds now it is not a hurt after all. Rather, it brought home to him that he feels weak and helpless. "I'm not really hurt" (he now finds), "it's more that it points up to me how I can't make it in the world" (passivity, castration, we may now say).
但是，當他繼續，我們發現，這些情況其實並不重要。沒什麼的！看起來是這麼小的事情，不值得為之煩擾。內容又變成了一些其他的，這是那個真正傷害的東西。而且他發現現在已經不能算是傷害了。而且，這讓他意識到他現在感覺虛弱和無助。“我並不真地覺得受傷”（他現在發現）， “這更像是這讓我知道我無法在這個世界上獲得成功！”（被動，閹割，我們現在可能會說）
The term "content mutation" can be applied to this sequential shifting of what seems to be the "content." Contents are process aspects of ongoing feeling process. They 31，can be symbolized because they function implicitly in that feeling process. As it is carried forward, there is referent movement and change in what can be symbolized. It is not merely a shifting of interpretation. There is referent movement--that is to say, that which is being symbolized is changing.
“內容轉變”的術語可以應用到序列性的轉變，它們看起來是內容。內容是正在進行的感受過程的方面。他們可以被符號化，因為他們在感受過程中暗在地發揮功能。當它被帶動的時候，指涉運動和變化會發生，而這可以被符號化。這不僅僅是解釋的轉變。這是指涉運動——就是說，現在正被符號化的物件變化了。
Content mutation does not imply that all our concepts are simply map, plicable. Often they are correct in terms of predicting the individual's other behaviors, and often they enable us to guess or be sensitively ready for a next content mutation. However, the concepts of personality contents are static and much too general [27] and empty. They are never a substitute for direct reference, referent movement, and content mutation.
內容轉變並不是說我們的概念是簡單的地圖，可以度量。內容轉變在預測個體的其他行為上經常是正確的，也經常讓我們可以去猜測或是更易感知下一個內容轉變。然而人格內容的概念是靜態的，太過籠統[27]並空洞的。他們從來都不能替代直接指涉，指涉運動和內容轉變。
