4.2.2 詮釋學筆記
作者: 張凱理 / 3477次阅读 时间: 2010年6月19日
标签: 詮釋學
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詮釋學筆記

“I have forgotten my umbrella”
(Nietzsche)


Hermes brings the message of destiny …
(Richard Palmer, 1969, p13)

Psychoanalysis, and in particular the interpretation of dreams, is very obviously a form of hermeneutics; the elements of the hermeneutical situation are all there …
(ibid, p43)

What is interpretation? This study ultimately suggests a specific orientation to the question --- the phenome-nological approach. (ibid, p5)


(1)    Six definitions of hermeneutics:

1.    the theory of biblical exegesis
2.    general philological methodology
3.    the science of all linguistic understanding
4.    the methodological foundation of Geisteswissenschaften
5.    phenomenology of existence and of existential understanding
6.    the systems of interpretation, both recollective and iconoclastic, used by man to reach the meaning behind myths and symbols
(ibid, p33)

(2)    創造的詮釋學:

實謂 What exactly did the original thinker or text say?
意謂 What did the original thinker or text intend or mean to say?
蘊謂 What could the original thinker or text have said?
What could the original thinker’s sayings have implied?
當謂 What should the original thinker have said?
What should the creative hermeneutician say on behalf of the original thinker?
必謂 What must the original thinker say now?
What must the creative hermeneutician do now, in order to carry out the unfinished philosophical task of the original thinker?
(傅偉勳, 1989)

(3)    Schleiermacher: Project of a general hermeneutics

1.    How is all or any utterance, whether spoken or written, really “understood”?
2.    Interpretation consists of two interacting moments: the grammatical and the psychological. The principle upon which this reconstruction stands, whether grammatical or psychological, is that of the hermeneutical circle.
3.    By dialectical interaction between the whole and the part, each gives the other meaning; understanding is circular … within the circle the meaning comes to stand, we call this the “hermeneutical circle.”
4.    To operate at all, the hermeneutical circle assumes an element of intuition.
5.    What is to be understood must already be known. … the minimal preknowledge necessary for understanding, without which one cannot leap into the hermeneutical circle.
6.    “The fulfilled understanding of style is the whole goal of hermeneutics.” (Schleiermacher, 1819)
7.    Only after many years would the assertion be advanced that the universals in understanding which Schleiermacher saw in scientific terms could be seen in historical terms, that is, in terms of the intrinsically historical structure of understanding and more specifically the importance of preunderstanding in all understanding.

(4)    Dilthey: hermeneutics as foundation of the Geisteswissenschaften

1.    Dilthey aims to develop methods of gaining “objectively valid” interpretations of “expressions of inner life.”
2.    … a romantic tinge of his emphasis on a return to life itself
3.    As H.A. Hodges notes in his book on Dilthey, two great Philosophical traditions, largely separate until then, met in Dilthey: Anglo-French empirical realism and positivism, and German idealism and life philosophy. Dilthey’s attempt to forge an epistemological foundation for the Geisteswissenschaften became a meeting place for two fundamentally conflicting views of the proper way to study man.
4.    … to find an approach adequate to the fullness of phenomena.
The task of finding the basis for such a methodology was seen as an pistemological problem, (2) a matter of deepening our conception of historical consciousness, and (3) a need to understand expressions from out of “life itself.”
5.    “critique of historical reason”
6.    The key word for the human studies, Dilthey believed, was “understanding.” Explaining is for the sciences, but the approach to phenomena which unites the inner and outer is understanding.
7.    experience-expression-understanding
Erlebnis (lived experience)
Ausdruck (expression, “objectification” of the mind)
Verstehen (understanding)
… the human studies linger lovingly over the particular for its own sake.
8.    “All recent efforts to understand human historicality find in Dilthey their decisive beginning.”
9.    “Life is the basic element or fact which must form the starting point for philosophy. It is knowledge from within. It is that behind which we cannot go. Life cannot be brought before the bar of reason.”
10.    … there can be no “presuppositionless” understanding. …
The methodological task of the interpreter, then, is not that of immersing himself totally in his object (which would be impossible, anyway) but rather that of finding viable modes of interaction of his own horizon with that of the text. … this is the question to which Gadamer gives considerable attention: how we can achieve, within the admitted use of our own horizon, an openness to the text which does not impose in advance our own categories upon it.
11.    We can see more clearly today that the quest for “objectively valid knowledge” was itself a reflection of scientific ideals wholly contrary to the historicality of our self-understanding.
12.    The epistemological basis of psychiatry (Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology, 1913)

Dilthey Today: A Critical Approach of the Contemporary Relevance of His Work (H.P. Rickman)
Chap 5: The epistemological basis of Psychiatry

(5)    Heidegger’s contribution to hermeneutics in Being and Time:

1.    … the kind of phenomenology that Heidegger developed in Being and Time is sometimes called hermeneutic phenomenology.
… his project in Being and Time was a “hermeneutic of Dasein”
2.    Phenomenology need not be construed as necessarily a laying-open of consciousness; it can also be a means of disclosing being.
3.    … phenomenology means letting things beome manifest as what they are, without forcing our own categories on them. … it is not we who point to things; rather, things show themselves to us. … the very essence of true understanding is that of being led by the power of the thing to manifest itself.
4.    … interpretation is not grounded in human consciousness and human categories but in the manifestness of the thing encountered, the reality that comes to meet us.
5.    Ontology must, as phenomenology of being, become a “hermeneutic” of existence.
6.    In Heidegger, hermeneutics is still the theory of understanding, but understanding is differently (ontologically) defined.
7.    … a broken hammer at once shows what a hammer is …At the point of breakdown, we may observe a significant fact:
the meaning of these objects lies in their relation to a structural whole of interrelated meanings and intentions. In breakdown, for a brief moment the meaning of the objects is lighted up, emerging directly from world.

(6)    The relevance of Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics to 36 topics or fields of human activity (Richard Palmer, 1999)


The central theses of Gadamer’s hermeneutics:
1.    To understand is in fact to interpret
2.    All understanding is essentially bound up with language
3.    The understanding of the meaning of text is inseparable from its application (Madison, 1988, p109)

One of the major motivations of Gadamer’s hermeneutical project
is to overcome or displace what he has called the age of epistemology.
his critique of classical hermeneutics in the person of Dilthey is directed primarily at the fact that it remains caught up in the modern epistemological, foundationalist project. (ibid, p108)

Gadamer’s hermeneutics is not primarily a method or technique for
reading and interpreting texts. … It is not, indeed, concerned with the epistemological questions of method and methodology at all. Rather, its goal is properly philosophical (whence the term “philosophical hermeneutics”) in that it seeks to determine what is involved in the understanding process itself, what it is that has actually happened whenever we claim to have arrived at an understanding of things, the world, ourselves. (ibid, p110)

The Enigma of Health (Gadamer, 1996)
Chap 13: Hermeneutics and Psychiatry
Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics (Jean Grondin, 1994)

(7)    Theses on Interpretation (Palmer, 1969, p242-253)

1.    The hermeneutical experience is intrinsically historical.
2.    The hermeneutical experience is intrinsically linguistic.
3.    The hermeneutical experience is dialectical.
4.    The hermeneutical experience is ontological.
5.    The hermeneutical experience is an event --- a “language event.”
… Language s not one’s tool, really, but the way being can come to appear. When one wishes to convey the being of a situation, he does not devise language to fit it, so much as find the language demanded by the situation.
6.    The hermeneutical experience is “objective.”
… what is meant is not a scientific but a truly “historical” objectivity
7.    The hermeneutical experience should be led by the text.
… the difficulties peculiar to genuine hermeneutical experience:the need to feel the objective claim of the text in its full otherness without, at the same time, making it a mere object for our subjectivity. … every true hermeneutical experience is a new creation, a new disclosure of being; it stands in a firm relationship to the present, and historically could not happened before.
8.    The hermeneutical experience understands what is said in the light of the present.
9.    The hermeneutical experience is a disclosure of truth.
10.    Aesthetics must be swallowed up in hermeneutics.
The “aesthetic moment” must be defined not in terms of sensuous pleasure in form but in what makes a work of art truly “art” --- the fact that in a definite form a world is abidingly able to come to stand, to open up a space in being, to enable the truth of being to become manifest. (ibid, p245)
11.    Transcending the subject-object schema
12.    The autonomy and objective status of the work of art
13.    It is not the interpreter who grasps the meaning of the text; the meaning of the text seizes him. … Art is art when it brings a world to stand before one; and great art has such a fullness of the truth of being that one finds his own horizon negated (in part), and a freshness of understanding occurs that can only be understood in terms of the category “experience”. … Reading a work, is not a gaining of conceptual knowledge through observation or reflection; it is an “experience.”
14.    … the need for historical consciousness in interpretation

(8)    Between Hermeneutics and Science: An Essay on the Epistemology of Psychoanalysis (Carlo Strenger, 1991)

The Creation of Reality in Psychoanalysis: A View of the Contributions of Donald Spence, Roy Schafer, Robert Stolorow, Irwin Z. Hoffman and Beyond (Richard Moore, 1999)

Five questions:
1.    What is the nature of reality?
2.    What is the nature of the human experience of reality?
3.    What is the nature of the communication of reality?
4.    What kind of knowledge can be gained on the basis of information gathered in a psychoanalytic session?
5.    What kind of action can be taken on the basis of knowledge
about the past gained in a psychoanalytic session?

(9)    Interpreting Interpretation: The Limits of Hermeneutic Psychoanalysis (Elyn Saks, 1999)
Five models:
1.    the clinical psychoanalysis model
2.    the story model
3.    the alternative physics model
4.    the phor model
5.    the interpretation-as-literary-criticism model

The argument from patient rejection --- the argument that patients could reject hermeneutic psychoanalysis if informed of its true nature.
(ibid, pviii)

Psychoanalysis and Hermeneutics, Robert Steele, IRPA, 1979, 6:389-411


(10)Reflecting Psychoanalysis: Narrative and Resolve in the Psychoanalytic Experience (Jurgen Reeder, 2002)

“With what legitimacy do I assume the right to interpret my fellow being?” (ibid, p3)

The psychoanalytic treatment situation and the individual path toward resolve and an ethical stance in relation to the self are investigated from a narrational point of view, according to which the telling of stories is a central feature in self-reflection and the maintenance of identity. Psychoanalytic work may be viewed as a joint task where analyst and analysand discover and eventually deconstruct the original narrative brought by the analysand. By analyzing the inconsistencies and lacunae in his narratives the analysand may arrive at a point of resolve --- here called the ethical moment --- where he may give up his resistances and choose a new path for his ways of telling, thereby reconstituting his self and reality. In this capacity to narrate from a radically new vantage-point lies the emancipatory potential of the psychoanalytic method.
This has ethical implications in that new ways of narrating open up to new possibilities for the subject’s ethical stance. The method of investigation is hermeneutic-phenomenological.

(10)    Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other: Re-reading Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics (James Risser, 1997)

The dialogical element of hermeneutic understanding means that what is brought to speech again is the voice of the other. … What is at stake in understanding is the otherness of the text and its ability to assert its truth against one’s own foremeaning. … how hermeneutic experience is comparable to the experience of the Thou in the I-Thou relation. (ibid, p15)

(11)    Psychoanalysis and the Postmodern Impulse: Knowing and Being since Freud’s Psychology (Barnaby Barratt, 1993)

… a postmodern mandate can be glimpsed in the writings (of Freud) between 1896 and 1914

The episteme of the modern era is characterized by identitarianism, which refers to patriarchy, the physics of presence, and the analytico-referential episteme.

The physics of presence: The hegemony of the notion of “being” as presence together with the unicity of time as a “succession of nows” that might have a singular beginning and a singular end. Philosophically established in Hellenic times between the sixth and fourth centuries B.C.E., the physics of presence gives Western culture its identity, including its sense of continuity, which is the sense that our more basic ideas all go back to Plato and Aristotle, and which gives Hellenic, Hebraic, Christic, and Islamic cosmologies a common history defining “Western
culture” as such.

The analytico-referential episteme: The (phallo)logocentric masterdiscourse that began to emerge as early as the twelfth century (with the rediscovery of Hellenic learning through Islamic and Hebraic sourses, and with gradual shifts in the theocratico-theological reason of medievalism, for example from conjunctive to disjunctive knowledge, and was fully established in the sixteenth century (with the gradual occultation of theocratico-theological discourse and later with the Copernican, Cartesian, and Newtonian revolutions). This episteme has governed Western reasoning for the last four hundred years --- the modern era.

… to name is to possess, the mathematize is to conquer,and to manipulate technologically is to dominate.

The modern era continues into the twentieth century, not by virtue of its philosophical intelligibility but because of the riptide of its genocidal technocratic advance. It is significant that Kojeve (1933-39), whose reading of Hegel has influenced many postmodern inclinations, argued that the grand Hegelian synthesis and systematization of reflectivity marked the end of the time of (modern) history and of its subject, “man”.

Throughout the twentieth century “new” solutions, exercises in nostalgia masquerading as novelty, are routinely advanced as if to rescue the crisis of modern science and modern philosophy:
a hermeneutics that appeals to conventions of coherence and wholeness, and existentialism or humanism that valorizes the individual actor, a phenomenology that is based on the ego and an idealized “reality” or life-world, a “dialectics” that jazzes up intersubjectivity without ever calling the subject into question,and a feminism that reprioritizes but nevertheless essentializes differences.

In various ways establishment “psychoanalysis” has developed in accordance with these retrograde efforts to restore the programmatics of the modern era. … interpretations are designed to arrive at an appearance of secured “truth”, … the otherwise otherness of libidinality and temporality is denied, … attempts to reverse the linguistic turn by appealing to na?ve assumption about “reality”, … refuses to interrogate its own assumptions about inegration, cohesion, adaptation, and the totality of “all that is”.

If Freud’s revolutionary discipline of discourse is not to disappear as such, it will move forward as the psychoanalysis of the otherwise and not as the “psychoanalysis” of establishment. … there is here a call to each of us to accept the commitment of the postmodern psychoanalyst as this work-play of the poet, philosopher, and revolutionary.

(12)    The Hermeneutics of Postmodernism: Figures and Themes (G.B. Madison, 1988)

… phenomenological hermeneutics differs from other forms of postmodernism in that it does not seek merely to deconstruct the traditional, physical notions of “knowledge” and “truth”;
it seeks to provide alternatives to them.
(Prologue: Toward a Poststructuralist Phenomenology, pxv)


What remains in the history still to be told --- and, in the telling, to be made --- is the story of poststructuralist phenomenology, a phenomenology which will have made profitable use of the many pertinent criticisms that poststructuralism has addressed not only to the Tradition but also to phenomenology itself. This is the conclusion the essays gathered together in this book collectively aim at --- but which, it goes without saying, is still outstanding. If the author does not get around actually to writing it, he hopes that his readers will.
(ibid, pxiv)www.psychspace.com心理学空间网
TAG: 詮釋學
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