作者: LACAN / 7581次阅读 时间: 2017年12月22日
来源: 雄伯 译 标签: 拉康

The demand for happiness andthe promise of analysis
雄伯 译

    1. The demand for happiness andthe promise of analysis幸福的要求与精神分析的展望
    5. HADES AND DIONYSOS海地思与戴奥尼索斯
    6. THE ANALYST'S DESIRE精神分析家的欲望

The report I gave two years ago at Royaumont on "The Direction of theCure" is to appear in the next issue of our review. The text is somewhatthrown together because I wrote it between two seminars I was giving here.I shall keep its improvised form, although I will try to fill out and rectifycertain things to be found there.



I said somewhere that an analyst has to pay something if he is to play hisrole.1我在某个地方说过,精神分析家必须付出某件东西,假如他想要扮演这个角色。

He pays in words, in his interpretations. He pays with his person to theextent that through the transference he is literally dispossessed. The wholecurrent development of analysis involves the misrecognition of the analyst,but whatever he thinks of that and whatever panic reaction the analyst engagesin through "the countertransference," he has no choice but to go through it.He's not the only one there with the person to whom he has made a commitment.


Finally, he has to pay with a judgment on his action. That's the minimumdemanded. Analysis is a judgment. It's required everywhere else, but if itseems scandalous to affirm it here, there is probably a reason. It is because,from a certain point of view, the analyst is fully aware that he cannot knowwhat he is doing in psychoanalysis. Part of this action remains hidden evento him.


And it is this that justifies the direction I have been taking you in this year,the point to which I have suggested you follow me, namely, there where thequestion of exploring the general ethical consequences involved in Freud'sopening up of the relationship to the unconscious is raised.


I grant that there was the appearance of a detour, but it was necessary soas to bring you closer to our ethics as analysts. A few reminders were neces-sary before I could bring you closer to the practice of analysis and its technicalproblems. In the present state of affairs, they can hardly be resolved throughsuch reminders.


In the first place, is it the end of analysis that is demanded of us? What isdemanded can be expressed in a simple word, bonheur or "happiness," asthey say in English. I'm not saying anything new in that; a demand for happinessis doubtless involved here.

首先,我们所被要求的是精神分析的目标吗?所被要求的东西,能够用一个简单的字词「幸福」 或是「快乐」来表达吗?,如同他们在英文所说的。我并没有说出任何新的东西,因为对于快乐的要求在这里,无可置疑地会被牵涉到。

In the report I referred to earlier - which, now that I see it in print, seemsa little too aphoristic, which explains why I will attempt here to lubricate itshinges a little - I allude to the question without explaining it further. Thebusiness is not helped by the fact that happiness has become a political matter.I won't go any further into this, but it is the reason why I ended thelecture called "Dialectical Psychoanalysis" - a lecture in which I brought toan end a certain period of activity in a group that we have broken with since- with the words, "There is no satisfaction for the individual outside of thesatisfaction of all."



To refocus analysis on the dialectic makes evident the fact that the goal isindefinitely postponed. It's not the fault of analysis if the question of happinesscannot be articulated in any other way at the present time. I would saythat it is because, as Saint-Just says, happiness has become a political matter.It is because happiness has entered the political realm that the question ofhappiness is not susceptible to an Aristotelian solution, that the prerequisiteis situated at the level of the needs of all men. Whereas Aristotle choosesbetween the different forms of the good that he offers the master, and tellshim that only certain of these are worthy of his devotion - namely, contemplation- the dialectic of the master has, I insist, been discredited in our eyesfor historical reasons that have to do with the period of history in which wefind ourselves. Those reasons are expressed in politics by the following formula:"There is no satisfaction for the individual outside of the satisfactionof all."


It is in such a context that analysis appears to be - without our being ableto explain why precisely it is the case in this context - and the analyst setshimself up to receive, a demand for happiness.


I have set out to show you this year the distance traveled since Aristotle,say, by choosing among some of the most crucial concepts. I wanted to makeyou feel the extent to which we approach these things differently, how far weare from any formulation of a discipline of happiness.


There is in Aristotle a discipline of happiness. He shows the paths alongwhich he intends to lead anyone who is willing to follow him in his problematic,paths which in different spheres of potential human activity lead to therealization of one of the functions of virtue. Such virtue is achieved throughμίσότης, something that is far from being a simple golden mean or a processlinked to the avoidance of excess; instead it is supposed to enable man tochoose that which might reasonably allow him to realize himself in his owngood.


Please note that one finds nothing similar in psychoanalysis. Along pathsthat would appear surprising to someone straight out of high school, we claimto allow the subject to put himself in a position such that things mysteriouslyand almost miraculously work themselves out right, provided he grasp themat the right end. Goodness only knows how obscure such a pretension as theachievement of genital objecthood (I 'objectalité genitale) remains, along withwhat is so imprudently linked to it, namely, adjustment to reality.


One thing only alludes to the possibility of the happy satisfaction of theinstinct, and that is the notion of sublimation. But it is clear that if one looksat the most esoteric formulation of the concept in Freud, in the context ofhis representing it as realized preeminently in the activity of the artist, itliterally means that man has the possibility of making his desires tradeable orsalable in the form of products. The frankness and even cynicism of such aformulation has in my eyes a great merit, although it is far from exhaustingthe fundamental question, and that is, How is it possible?


The other formulation consists of informing us that sublimation is the satisfactionof the drive with a change of object, that is, without repression. This definition is a profounder one, but it would also open up an even knottier problematic, if it weren't for the fact that my teaching allows you to spot where the rabbit is hidden.


In effect, the rabbit to be conjured from the hat is already to be found inthe instinct. This rabbit is not a new object; it is a change of object in itself.If the drive allows the change of object, it is because it is already deeplymarked by the articulation of the signifier. In the graph of desire that I gaveyou, the instinct is situated at the level of the unconscious articulation of asignifying series and is for this reason constituted as fundamental alienation.That is why, on the other hand, each of the signifiers composing this seriesis joined by a common element.


In the definition of sublimation as satisfaction without repression, whetherimplicitly or explicitly, there is a passage from not-knowing to knowing, arecognition of the fact that desire is nothing more than the metonymy of thediscourse of demand. It is change as such. I emphasize the following: theproperly metonymic relation between one signifier and another that we calldesire is not a new object or a previous object, but the change of object initself.

在升华的定义,作为没有受到压抑的满足,无论是含蓄或是明确,都会从未知通过到已知,体认到这个事实: 欲望仅仅就是要求的辞说的换喻。欲望就是变化的本身。我强调如下: 在一个能指与另外一个能指之间的适当的换喻的关系,我们称为这种适当换喻的关系的欲望,并不是一种新的客体,或是一个先前的客体,而是客体本身的变化。

Let me cite as an example something that occurred to me when I waspreparing these comments for you, so that I could give an image of what Imean by sublimation. Think of the shift from a verb to what in grammar iscalled its complement or, in a more philosophical grammar, its determinative. Think of the most radical of verbs in the development of the phases ofthe drive, the verb "to eat." There is "eating." That is how the verb, theaction, appears head-first in many languages, before there is any determinationas to who is involved. Thus one sees here the secondary character of thesubject, since we don't even have the subject, the something that is there tobe eaten.


There is eating - the eating of what? Of the book.


When in the Apocalypse we read this powerful image, "eat the book," whatdoes it mean? - if it isn't that the book itself acquires the value of an incorporation,the incorporation of the signifier itself, the support of the properlyapocalyptic creation. The signifier in this instance becomes God, the objectof the incorporation itself.

在圣经的「启示录」,我们阅读这个强而有力的意象:「吃这本书」。那是什么意思?难道不就是: 书的本身获得一种被融合的价值?这个能指本身的被融化,支持适当来说是世纪末的创造。在这个情况,这个能指变成上帝,被融合的本身的客体。

In daring to formulate a satisfaction that isn't rewarded with a repression,the theme that is central or preeminent is, What is desire? And in this connectionI can only remind you of what I have articulated in the past: realizingone's desire is necessarily always raised from the point of view of an absolutecondition. It is precisely to the extent that the demand always under- orovershoots itself that, because it articulates itself through the signifier, it alwaysdemands something else; that in every satisfaction of a need, it insists onsomething else; that the satisfaction formulated spreads out and conforms tothis gap; that desire is formed as something supporting this metonymy, namely,as something the demand means beyond whatever it is able to formulate. Andthat is why the question of the realization of desire is necessarily formulatedfrom the point of view of a Last Judgment.


Try to imagine what "to have realized one's desire" might mean, if it is notto have realized it, so to speak, in the end. It is this trespassing of death onlife that gives its dynamism to any question that attempts to find a formulationfor the subject of the realization of desire. To illustrate what I am saying,if we pose directly the question of desire on the basis of that Parminedeanabsolutism, which eliminates everything that is not being, then we will say,nothing is from that which is not born, and all that exists lives only in thelack of being.

请你们尝试想像「已经实现自己的欲望」会是意味著什么?它难道不是在最后,所谓的终于实现了它?就是死亡对于生命的这种逾越,给予它的动力,对于企图要找到阐释的问题,给实现欲望的主体。为了举例说明我正在说的东西,假如我们直接提出欲望的这个问题,根据巴门尼底斯的绝对主义的基础,它减掉一切并不存在的东西。那么我们将会说:没有一样东西的存在,是出诸于没有被诞生的东西; 所有存在的东西,仅是在存在的欠缺中生活著。

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