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Endnote心理学空间8e"zCl!]%_

¹In discussing Wittgenstein’s language game psychologist Lois Shawver (http://users.california.com/~rathbone/word.htm) quotes him, “. . . the term 'language game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the 'speaking' of language is part of an activity, or form of life.” Continuing, she suggests that language game “refers to models of primitive language that Wittgenstein invents to clarify the working of language in general. . . .The idea is that if we think in terms of language games, that is, if we ask how our language games are taught and how they are used, then we will begin to see past certain myths in our culture that trap us in misleading pictures of language processes and communication.  Getting past these pictures will enable us to see human psychology with fresh eyes, but what we see with fresh eyes is not predetermined.  Wittgenstein does not tell us what we will see.  He simply helps us see past these ancient pictures because, quoting Wittgenstein, “A 'picture' held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.