- The demand for happiness andthe promise of analysis幸福的要求与精神分析的展望
- DESIRE AND THE LAST JUDGMENT欲望与最后审判
- THE SECOND DEATH二次死亡
- THE FABLE OP THE CLODHOPPERS厚鞋的寓言
- HADES AND DIONYSOS海地思与戴奥尼索斯
- THE ANALYST'S DESIRE精神分析家的欲望
The report I gave two years ago at Royaumont on "The Direction of theCure" is to appear in the next issue of our review. The text is somewhatthrown together because I wrote it between two seminars I was giving here.I shall keep its improvised form, although I will try to fill out and rectifycertain things to be found there.
两年前，我在罗夭曼发表这个报告「治疗的方向」。这篇报告将发表在我们的评论的下一期。这个文本是聚拢而成，因为我书写它，在我这里正在举行的两个研讨班之间。我将保留它急就章写成的形态，虽然我将尝试填补而且修正某些能够在那里发现的东西。
1
I said somewhere that an analyst has to pay something if he is to play hisrole.1我在某个地方说过，精神分析家必须付出某件东西，假如他想要扮演这个角色。
He pays in words, in his interpretations. He pays with his person to theextent that through the transference he is literally dispossessed. The wholecurrent development of analysis involves the misrecognition of the analyst,but whatever he thinks of that and whatever panic reaction the analyst engagesin through "the countertransference," he has no choice but to go through it.He's not the only one there with the person to whom he has made a commitment.
他用文字，用他的解释付出。他用他的人格付出，甚至凭借他的移情，他几乎是被剥夺所拥有的东西。精神分析的整个的目前的发展，牵涉到对精神分析家的误认，但是无论他怎么看法，无论精神分析家从事怎样的惊慌的反应，凭借「反移情」，他别无选择，除了经历它。他在那里并不是唯一具有这个人格的人，他曾经对这个人格做出献身奉献。
Finally, he has to pay with a judgment on his action. That's the minimumdemanded. Analysis is a judgment. It's required everywhere else, but if itseems scandalous to affirm it here, there is probably a reason. It is because,from a certain point of view, the analyst is fully aware that he cannot knowwhat he is doing in psychoanalysis. Part of this action remains hidden evento him.
最后，他必须付出，用对于他的行动的判断。那是被要求的最基本。精神分析是一种判断。它在每个其他地方被要求。但是假如在此肯定它似乎是引起非议，可能有其理由。那是因为，从某个观点，精神分析家充分知道，他无法知道他在精神分析里正在做些什么。甚至他自己，部分的这个行动始终隐而不显。
And it is this that justifies the direction I have been taking you in this year,the point to which I have suggested you follow me, namely, there where thequestion of exploring the general ethical consequences involved in Freud'sopening up of the relationship to the unconscious is raised.
就是这个证明我今年引导你们的这个方向是正确的。我曾经建议你们应该跟随我到达的这点。换句话说，这个问题被提出：在弗洛依德展开跟无意识的关系，所牵涉到探索通俗的伦理的各种结果。
I grant that there was the appearance of a detour, but it was necessary soas to bring you closer to our ethics as analysts. A few reminders were neces-sary before I could bring you closer to the practice of analysis and its technicalproblems. In the present state of affairs, they can hardly be resolved throughsuch reminders.
我承认，外表上会有个迂回，但是这是必须的，为了要引导你们靠近我们作为精神分析家的伦理学。我需要做一些提醒，我才能够引导你们靠近精神分析的实践及其技术的问题。在目前的事情的状态，仅是凭借这样的提醒，它们几乎让人束手无策。
In the first place, is it the end of analysis that is demanded of us? What isdemanded can be expressed in a simple word, bonheur or "happiness," asthey say in English. I'm not saying anything new in that; a demand for happinessis doubtless involved here.
首先，我们所被要求的是精神分析的目标吗？所被要求的东西，能够用一个简单的字词「幸福」 或是「快乐」来表达吗？，如同他们在英文所说的。我并没有说出任何新的东西，因为对于快乐的要求在这里，无可置疑地会被牵涉到。
In the report I referred to earlier - which, now that I see it in print, seemsa little too aphoristic, which explains why I will attempt here to lubricate itshinges a little - I allude to the question without explaining it further. Thebusiness is not helped by the fact that happiness has become a political matter.I won't go any further into this, but it is the reason why I ended thelecture called "Dialectical Psychoanalysis" - a lecture in which I brought toan end a certain period of activity in a group that we have broken with since- with the words, "There is no satisfaction for the individual outside of thesatisfaction of all."
在我早先提到的这篇报告，现在我看到它被出版，它似乎有点太过于警语方式。它解释为什么我在此将会企图稍微润饰它一下。我提到这个问题，但是没有更进一步解释它。幸福已经成为是一件政治的事情，这个事实对于事情并没有帮助。我将不会更进一步讨论这个。但是它是这个理由，我结束我的演讲，题目是「辩证法的精神分析」。在这场演讲，我结束某个时期的团体活动，从此我跟这个团体就已经分道扬镳。我当时说：「个人无法在全体的满足外面，自寻满足。」
雄伯说伟哉！拉康！有如无量寿佛的宏愿：「我当哀愍，度脱一切，十方众生，心悦清净，已至我国，快乐安稳。」
To refocus analysis on the dialectic makes evident the fact that the goal isindefinitely postponed. It's not the fault of analysis if the question of happinesscannot be articulated in any other way at the present time. I would saythat it is because, as Saint-Just says, happiness has become a political matter.It is because happiness has entered the political realm that the question ofhappiness is not susceptible to an Aristotelian solution, that the prerequisiteis situated at the level of the needs of all men. Whereas Aristotle choosesbetween the different forms of the good that he offers the master, and tellshim that only certain of these are worthy of his devotion - namely, contemplation- the dialectic of the master has, I insist, been discredited in our eyesfor historical reasons that have to do with the period of history in which wefind ourselves. Those reasons are expressed in politics by the following formula:"There is no satisfaction for the individual outside of the satisfactionof all."
将精神分析重新集中焦点于辩证法，可以凸显这个事实：目标无限期地被拖延。这并不是精神分析的过错，假如目前幸福的这个问题无法用别的方式来表达。我不妨说，这是因为，如同圣、噶思特所说，政治已经成为是一件政治的事情。那是因为幸福已经进入政治的领域，幸福的问题并不轻易接受亚里斯多德的解决方式。这个先决条件被定位在所有人类的需要的层次。虽然亚里斯多德在他提供给主人的不同形式的善行里作选择，并且告诉主人，这些善行仅有某些是值得他的奉献。换句话说，沉思。我坚持认为，在我们眼中，主人的辩证法已经不受到推崇，因为历史的理由必须跟我们发现自己所处的历史的时期有关。那些理由在政治上被表达，用以下的公式：「个人无法在全体的满足的外面，寻求满足。」
It is in such a context that analysis appears to be - without our being ableto explain why precisely it is the case in this context - and the analyst setshimself up to receive, a demand for happiness.
精神分析家似乎就是处于这样的情境。我们无法解释为什么，确实就是在这个情境的情况，精神分析家从事接纳，对于幸福的要求。
I have set out to show you this year the distance traveled since Aristotle,say, by choosing among some of the most crucial concepts. I wanted to makeyou feel the extent to which we approach these things differently, how far weare from any formulation of a discipline of happiness.
今年，我曾经开始跟你们显示，自从亚里斯多德以来所经历的旅程，譬如说，凭借在一些最重要的观念里选择。我想要让你们感觉这个程度，我们以不同方式探索这些事情的程度，我们距离幸福这个学科的的任何说明，还有多遥远。
There is in Aristotle a discipline of happiness. He shows the paths alongwhich he intends to lead anyone who is willing to follow him in his problematic,paths which in different spheres of potential human activity lead to therealization of one of the functions of virtue. Such virtue is achieved throughμίσότης, something that is far from being a simple golden mean or a processlinked to the avoidance of excess; instead it is supposed to enable man tochoose that which might reasonably allow him to realize himself in his owngood.
在亚里斯多德，有一门幸福的学科。他显示这些途径，沿着这些途径，他打算引导任何愿意跟随他的人，走上他的困难重重的途径。在各种不同的潜在的人类活动的领域，这些途径通往其中一个品德的功能的实现。这样的品德被获得，凭借某件绝非是单纯的中庸之道，或是跟避免过度相关的过程。代替的，它应该让人们选择，可能合理地让他凭借他自己的善实现他自己的东西。
Please note that one finds nothing similar in psychoanalysis. Along pathsthat would appear surprising to someone straight out of high school, we claimto allow the subject to put himself in a position such that things mysteriouslyand almost miraculously work themselves out right, provided he grasp themat the right end. Goodness only knows how obscure such a pretension as theachievement of genital objecthood (I 'objectalité genitale) remains, along withwhat is so imprudently linked to it, namely, adjustment to reality.
请注意，我们在精神分析找不到任何类似的东西。沿着这些途径，某个刚从高中毕业的人会感到惊奇。我们宣称容许主体将他自己放置在这样一个立场，事情神秘而几乎奇迹地运作，只要他从适当的角度理解他们。只有天晓得，这样一种伪装始终是多么的模糊，如同性器官客体化的成就。外加不谨慎跟它联接在一块的东西。也就是说，跟现实适应的东西。
One thing only alludes to the possibility of the happy satisfaction of theinstinct, and that is the notion of sublimation. But it is clear that if one looksat the most esoteric formulation of the concept in Freud, in the context ofhis representing it as realized preeminently in the activity of the artist, itliterally means that man has the possibility of making his desires tradeable orsalable in the form of products. The frankness and even cynicism of such aformulation has in my eyes a great merit, although it is far from exhaustingthe fundamental question, and that is, How is it possible?
有一件东西仅是提到跟本能的快乐满足的可能性，那就是升华的观念。显而易见地，假如我们观看弗洛依德对于这个观念的奥秘的阐释，在他呈现它，作为特别是是在艺术家的活动，被实现的内涵。它几乎意味着，人拥有这个可能性：让他的各种欲望，可以用产品的形式，作为交易与销售。依我之见，这样一种阐释的坦率，甚至的嘲讽，具有很大的优点。虽然它绝对无法穷尽基本的问题。那就是，它如何是可能呢？
The other formulation consists of informing us that sublimation is the satisfactionof the drive with a change of object, that is, without repression. This definition is a profounder one, but it would also open up an even knottier problematic, if it weren't for the fact that my teaching allows you to spot where the rabbit is hidden.
另外一个阐释内容在于告诉我们，升华是以客体的转变，来满足冲动，换句话说，没有受到压抑。这种定义是一种更加深刻的定义，但是它也展开一个甚至更加纠缠的难题，假如不是因为这个事实：我的教学让你们能够觉察出兔子隐藏在哪里。
In effect, the rabbit to be conjured from the hat is already to be found inthe instinct. This rabbit is not a new object; it is a change of object in itself.If the drive allows the change of object, it is because it is already deeplymarked by the articulation of the signifier. In the graph of desire that I gaveyou, the instinct is situated at the level of the unconscious articulation of asignifying series and is for this reason constituted as fundamental alienation.That is why, on the other hand, each of the signifiers composing this seriesis joined by a common element.
事实上，应该从帽子里被召唤出来的兔子，应该是已经在这个本能里。这隻兔子并不是一个新的客体。它是客体本身的改变。假如冲动容许客体改变，那是因为它已经深深地被这个能指的表达标记。在我给予你们的欲望的图形，本能被定位在一个能指系列的无意识表达的层次。因为这个理由，它被形成，作为是基本的异化。在另一方面，那就是为什么每个组成这个系列的能指，会跟一个共同的因素联接一块。
In the definition of sublimation as satisfaction without repression, whetherimplicitly or explicitly, there is a passage from not-knowing to knowing, arecognition of the fact that desire is nothing more than the metonymy of thediscourse of demand. It is change as such. I emphasize the following: theproperly metonymic relation between one signifier and another that we calldesire is not a new object or a previous object, but the change of object initself.
在升华的定义，作为没有受到压抑的满足，无论是含蓄或是明确，都会从未知通过到已知，体认到这个事实： 欲望仅仅就是要求的辞说的换喻。欲望就是变化的本身。我强调如下： 在一个能指与另外一个能指之间的适当的换喻的关系，我们称为这种适当换喻的关系的欲望，并不是一种新的客体，或是一个先前的客体，而是客体本身的变化。
Let me cite as an example something that occurred to me when I waspreparing these comments for you, so that I could give an image of what Imean by sublimation. Think of the shift from a verb to what in grammar iscalled its complement or, in a more philosophical grammar, its determinative. Think of the most radical of verbs in the development of the phases ofthe drive, the verb "to eat." There is "eating." That is how the verb, theaction, appears head-first in many languages, before there is any determinationas to who is involved. Thus one sees here the secondary character of thesubject, since we don't even have the subject, the something that is there tobe eaten.
让我引述某件我偶然想到的东西，作为例子，当我正在跟你们准备这些评论的时候。这样，我才能给予一个意象，对于我所说的升华是什么意思。请你们想想这个转变，从动词，转变到文法所谓的它的补语，或是，用更加是哲学的文法，它的决定词。请你们思考一下，在冲动的这些过程的发展，最为强烈的动词，「吃」这个动词。分词是「正在吃」。那就是为什么在许多语言里，这个动词，这个动作，首当其冲地出现。然后才有决定词，关于是谁牵涉在内。因此，我们在此看到，主体的第二个特性，因为我们甚至并没有这个主词，在那里的某件东西能够被吃。
There is eating - the eating of what? Of the book.
正在吃—什么东西正在被吃？书正在被吃。
When in the Apocalypse we read this powerful image, "eat the book," whatdoes it mean? - if it isn't that the book itself acquires the value of an incorporation,the incorporation of the signifier itself, the support of the properlyapocalyptic creation. The signifier in this instance becomes God, the objectof the incorporation itself.
在圣经的「启示录」，我们阅读这个强而有力的意象：「吃这本书」。那是什么意思？难道不就是： 书的本身获得一种被融合的价值？这个能指本身的被融化，支持适当来说是世纪末的创造。在这个情况，这个能指变成上帝，被融合的本身的客体。
In daring to formulate a satisfaction that isn't rewarded with a repression,the theme that is central or preeminent is, What is desire? And in this connectionI can only remind you of what I have articulated in the past: realizingone's desire is necessarily always raised from the point of view of an absolutecondition. It is precisely to the extent that the demand always under- orovershoots itself that, because it articulates itself through the signifier, it alwaysdemands something else; that in every satisfaction of a need, it insists onsomething else; that the satisfaction formulated spreads out and conforms tothis gap; that desire is formed as something supporting this metonymy, namely,as something the demand means beyond whatever it is able to formulate. Andthat is why the question of the realization of desire is necessarily formulatedfrom the point of view of a Last Judgment.
当我们大胆地阐释这样一种并没有受到压抑酬报的满足，作为中心或凸显的主题是：「欲望是什么？」关于这点，我仅能够提醒你们，我在过去曾经表达的东西：我们的欲望的实现，必然总是从一个绝对情况的观点被提出。甚至确实就是：这个要求总是没有被达到，或是被超过。因为它凭借这个能指来表达它自己，它总是要求某件其他的东西。在需求的每个满足里，它坚持某件其他东西；被阐释的满足展现开来，并且符合这个差距；欲望被形成，作为是某件支持这个换喻。换句话说，作为是要求意味的某件东西，超越它所能够阐释的东西。那就是为什么欲望的实现的问题，必然是从「最后审判」的观点来阐释。
Try to imagine what "to have realized one's desire" might mean, if it is notto have realized it, so to speak, in the end. It is this trespassing of death onlife that gives its dynamism to any question that attempts to find a formulationfor the subject of the realization of desire. To illustrate what I am saying,if we pose directly the question of desire on the basis of that Parminedeanabsolutism, which eliminates everything that is not being, then we will say,nothing is from that which is not born, and all that exists lives only in thelack of being.
请你们尝试想像「已经实现自己的欲望」会是意味著什么？它难道不是在最后，所谓的终于实现了它？就是死亡对于生命的这种逾越，给予它的动力，对于企图要找到阐释的问题，给实现欲望的主体。为了举例说明我正在说的东西，假如我们直接提出欲望的这个问题，根据巴门尼底斯的绝对主义的基础，它减掉一切并不存在的东西。那么我们将会说：没有一样东西的存在，是出诸于没有被诞生的东西； 所有存在的东西，仅是在存在的欠缺中生活著。
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