PSYCHOTIC COMMUNICATION 精神病的沟通
In his so-called ‘Rome Discourse’ (1977e[1953]), Lacan set out to revalue the function of speech within psychoanalytic treatment. Observing that psychoanalysis was drifting away towards some kind of enlightened behaviourism, he argued that psychoanalysts urgently needed to acknowledge that their clinical practice was invented as a ‘talking cure’ and that its salutary effects were predicated upon the power of speech.
在他所谓的“罗马辞说”，拉康开始重新评估言说的功能，在精神分析的治疗内部。当他观察到，精神分析正在漂浮离开，朝向某种的被启蒙的行为主义，他主张说，精神分析迫切地需要承认，他们的临床的实践被发明，作为一种“谈话治疗”。这个谈话治疗的有益的效果，就在言说的力量里被判定。
To Lacan, the truly Freudian revolution lay in the discovery that words have the potential to precipitate, perpetuate and eradicate both physical and mental symptoms, a conclusion which psychoanalysts were more and more neglecting in favour of pre-verbal, ‘behavioural engineering’. Redeeming Freud’s legacy, Lacan asserted that the power of speech is nothing magical, but a quality derived from the fact that a human being’s law is the law of language (ibid.: 61). The symbolic structure of language presides over human beings, who not only derive their speech but their entire ‘humanity’ from it, including their specific problems.
对于拉康，这个确实是弗洛伊德的革命就在于这个发现：文字具有判定，使存在，与抹除生理与心理的症状的潜力。可是，精神分析越来越加排斥这个结论，而赞同文辞之前，‘行为主义的工程学“。当他赎回弗洛伊德的遗产时，拉康主张，言说的力量并不是什么魔法的东西，而且从这个事实得来的特质：人类的法则就是语言的法则。语言的症状的结构操控着人类。人类不但从语言获得他们的言说，而且获得他们的完整的”人性“，包括他们的明确的难题。
This being the kernel of Lacan’s 1953 discourse and his main argument for reorganizing psychoanalysis around speech and language, he at once pointed out that not every human being integrates these structuring components in the same manner. Lacan even went so far as to say that the relation between speech and language can sometimes be outright paradoxical in particular subjects (ibid.: 68).
当这个结论成为拉康的1953年的辞说与主要论述，用来重新组织环绕言说与语言的精神分析，拉康立即指出，并不是每个人都会融合这些作为结构的成分，用相同的方式。拉康甚至过分地说：言说与语言之间的关系有时是彻底的悖论，在特殊的主体身上。
As a first example of this, he adduced the general clinical category of madness (folie). Here, the paradox is that people can talk freely about what bothers them, that they use language flexibly in order to construct extremely sophisticated delusional systems, and play with words uninhibitedly, whilst at the same time completely disowning their own language.
作为这个主张的第一个例子，拉康补充疯狂的通用临床范畴。在此，这个悖论是，人类能够自由地谈论有关困扰他们的事情。他们有弹性地使用语言，为了建构极端精致的幻觉的系统，病情没有压抑地玩弄文字。同时，他们又完全不承认他们自己的语言。
Lacan indicated that in psychosis radical freedom of speech is paired with an absence of the spoken word, because the latter no longer addresses itself to somebody else: ‘the subject, one might say, is spoken rather than speaking’ (ibid.: 69). As Lacan had already underscored in a 1946 discussion with Henri Ey, psychotic people are in a sense the most free individuals one can imagine, yet for this radical freedom they have to pay with their bodies and souls (Lacan 1966a[1946]:176; Miller 1987:143).6
拉康指出，在精神病，强烈的言说的自由，匹配著被言说的文词的缺席。因为被言说的文词不再针对另外一个人言说它自己：我们不妨说，「主体被言说，而不是正在言说」。如同在1946年跟亨利 艾伊的讨论，拉康已经强调，精神病的人们在某个意义上是我们能够想像的最自由的个人。可是，为了获得这个强烈的自由，他们用身体与灵魂付出代价。
It was not until 1955–56, when Lacan embarked on an investigation of the memoirs of President Schreber (Schreber 1988[1903]) and Freud’s analysis of the book (Freud 1911c[1910]), that he further specified the singular nature of speech and language in psychosis. At the start of Seminar III, Lacan maintained that speech generally addresses itself to others (interlocutors and addressees, including oneself), yet immediately adding that beyond these others, speech also involves the Other (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:36–38).
直到1955-56年，当拉康从事研究许瑞伯庭长的回忆录与弗洛伊德对于这本书的分析，他才更进一步地指明在精神病者，言说与语言的独异性特性。在第三研讨班的开始，拉康主张，言说通常针对别人言说它自己（对谈者与言说者，包括自己）。可是，他马上就补充说：除了这些别人之外，言说也牵涉到大他者。
The Other is nothing but the dimension of the others that remains unknown to the speaker, because he approaches them via language. Language erects a wall between the addresser and the addressee, as a result of which the others become partly unfathomable (Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:244–247). Put differently, the other represents the addressee in so far as she is recognized and known (as another self, an alter ego) by the speaker, whereas the Other entails the recognized, yet never fully ascertained aspect of this addressee.
大他者仅仅就是被人的维度，在言说者始终并不知道。因为他接近他们，经由语言。语言竖立起一个墙壁，在言说者与对谈者之间。由于这个墙壁的结果，其余的人们有些部分变得深不可测。换句话说，另一个人代表被对谈者。因为她被体认，被知道，被言说者，作为另外一个自我，一个他我。另一方面，大他者涵盖这位被言说者的被体认，可是又永远没有充分被确定的层面。 To illustrate this, Lacan referred to a message such as ‘You are my master’, transmitted by an individual to a known other (the ‘you’ in the sentence) without the sender being able to know for sure whether this other person really is or wants to be a master (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:37–38).
为了说明这个，拉康提到一个讯息，例如，“你是我的主人“，被一位个人传递给一位认识的他者（在句子里的这个”你“）。送讯息的人并不能够确实知道，这位他者是否确实是主人，或想要成为主人。
Here, communication is not a simple process of two comparable agencies (senders and receivers) exchanging information, but a threefold interaction between two (or more) individuals and the Other, in which assumptions are being made and agreements being sought. Indeed, the wall imposed by language between the speaker and her interlocutors requires people to set limits in order to define and control each other’s positions. The wall does not merely bar access to the complete other; it also urges people to make arrangements about each other’s specific contributions in the interaction, and to engage themselves in the establishment of symbolic pacts.
在此，沟通并不是两个对比的代理者的交换讯息的一个简单的过程（送讯息者与接收讯息者）。而是三重的互动，在两位或更多位个人与大他者之间。在这个三重互动里，假设被形成，共识被寻求。的确，语言所赋加的墙壁，在言说者与她的对谈者之间的墙壁，要求人们竖立限制，为了要定义与控制互相的立场。这个墙壁并不仅禁止接近完整的他者，墙壁也建议人们从事一些安排，关于彼此的明确的贡献，在这个互动里，并且参与象征盟约的建立。
Applying this dynamics to what is happening with psychotics, Lacan arrived at the key insight that in psychosis the Other is excluded (ibid.: 52–53). This does not mean that language and speech disappear— indeed, psychotics can be very loquacious, and when they do remain silent, it is often because they are invaded by highly eloquent voices—but that communication has lost its dimension of the unknown.
当拉康运用这个动力到精神病者正在发生的情况，拉康获得这个关键的洞察力：在精神病，大他者被排除在外。这并不意味着，语言与言说消失—的确，精神病者有时会侃侃而谈。当他们确实保持沉默时，那经常是因为他们被高度滔滔不绝的声音所侵犯。但是，那种沟通已经丧失它拥有这个未知者的维度。
For a psychotic person, nothing is unsure within what is being transmitted; sentences are unidimensional, a word does not carry any other meaning than that which is presented by the word itself. This evidently brings to mind Freud’s example of the woman with the twisted eyes, for whom it was impossible to assimilate that Augenverdreher (also and primarily) means ‘deceiver’. Lacan reformulated this mechanism saying that ‘the signifier itself (and not that which it signifies)…is the object of the communication’, which entails fundamental modifications of the entire language structure (the symbolic code) (Lacan 1977h[1957–58]:184).
对于一位精神病者，在正在被传递的东西之内，没有一样东西不确定，句子是单一维度，一个字词并没有带著任何的其他意义，除了就是这个字词自身呈现的东西。这显而易见地让人想起弗洛伊德例子：眼睛戴着眼罩的女人。对于她，接受那个t Augenverdreher 是不可能的，（那个字词也意味着，主要意味著“欺骗者）。拉康重新铨释这个心理机制，他说：「能指自身（并不是它指示的东西） 就是沟通的目标」，这个目标涵盖基本的修正完整的语言结构（象征的模式）。
This altered psychotic language system demonstrates a number of peculiarities. According to Lacan, one of the most salient phenomena of the psychotic ‘neo-code’ concerns its containment of new linguistic formations, ‘expressions that are neological in form…and usage’ (ibid.: 184). Schreber’s designation for his own ‘neo-code’, the Grundsprache (basic language) is an example of a formal neologism, because it does not belong as such to a shared linguistic domain.
这个被改变的精神病的语言系统，证明许多的特殊性。依照拉康，精神病的“新符码”的其中最主要的现象，关系到它包含新的语言的形成，“在形式上与用法上是新形成的表达”。许瑞伯的设计对于他自己的“新符码”，这个“基本语言”是正式的新词的例子，因为它的自身并没有属于共同分享的语言的领域。
His notion of Seelenmord (soul murder) could be termed a neologism of usage, because it was transferred from an already existing discourse to a delusional context.7 Both types of neologism convey nothing more than their ‘nominal’ meaning. Lacan stated that ‘for the subject this high voltage of the signifier drops’ (ibid.: 185), that is to say, the signifier is being discharged to the point where but one meaningful unit remains. Consequently, expressions impose themselves on the psychotic patient as refrains in a popular song; they reappear time and again in the same fashion.
他对于“谋杀灵魂”的观念，能够被给予用法的新词的术语，因为它从一个已经存在的辞说里被转移到幻觉的内涵里。两种的新词传递的仅仅是它们的“正常的”意义。拉康陈述：「对于主体，这个能指的高瓦特降低下来」。换句话说，这个能指正在被解除电荷到仅剩一个意义的单位的程度。结果，各种的表达赋加它们自己到精神病人身上，如同流行歌曲的这些叠句：这些叠句以相同的方式一再地重新出现。
For people are evidently only driven to use different words and phrases when they feel that their previous expressions have not adequately conveyed the intended meaning, or when there is a risk that the others will understand them incorrectly. When there is no such risk because ambiguity has been excluded, different words are unnecessary.
因为，当人们感觉他们先前的表达并没有充分地传达所意图的意义时，或是当别人将会错误地理解他们时的危险时，他们显而易见地仅是被迫使用不同的文词与词语。当这样的危险并不存在时，因为模糊嗳昧已经被排除，不同的字词是不必要的。
Apart from these alterations of the language system, psychotics also manifest idiosyncrasies on the level of the message. Relying on examples reported by Schreber in his memoirs, Lacan pointed out that psychotic messages always include a challenge between the involved partners. Schreber for instance described how divine figures tormented him day and night by uttering unfinished sentences such as ‘Now I will myself and ‘You ought to…’, which he was then forced to complete with the appropriate endpart, respectively ‘…face the fact that I am an idiot’ and ‘…be exposed as the negator of God and as given up to dissolute sensuality, not to mention other things’.
除了语言系统的这些轮替，精神病者也展现一下怪癖，在讯息的层面。当拉康凭借许瑞伯在他的回忆录报导的各种例子，他指出说：精神病的讯息总是包括被牵涉到伴侣之间一个挑战。譬如，许瑞伯描述，神性的形象如何日夜地折磨他。他们讲出没有完整的句子，譬如，“现在我意愿我自己、、、”与“你应该、、、、”他因此被迫来完成这些句子，用合适的结尾，各别是“我愿意面对这个事实：我是一位白痴”与“你应该被揭发，作为否定上帝的人，并且是耽溺于放荡的感官享受的人，更不用说是耽溺于其他的东西的人。”
A first salient characteristic of these messages, on Lacan’s account, is that the sending agency, in stopping just before the part of the sentence that would make the content of the message clear, reduces the message to a grammatical form of address. The only meaning the fragmented sentences uttered by Schreber’s voices still have is the meaning of ‘message’ as such. The interrupted messages mean nothing except for the grammatically determined fact that they are being addressed to somebody.
根据拉康的描述，这些讯息的一个最初突出的特征是：送出的代理者，当他仅是停顿在句子的这个部分的前面，这个部分将会让讯息的内容明朗。送出的代理者将这个讯息化简成为对谈的文法的形式。许瑞伯的声音表达的这些成为片断的句子依旧拥有的唯一的意义，是“讯息”作为自身的意义。被中断的那些讯息并没有意味别的，除了就是被文法决定的这个事实：它们正在被用来针对某个人的言谈。
A second distinguishing feature of these messages is that Schreber has to add his own part on the basis of his knowledge of the code—every beginning has its proper ending—in order to restore their communicative value. The messages are, in Lacan’s words, ‘a hallucinatory provocation’ (ibid.: 186) because they incite and coerce Schreber to produce what he knows. In addition, Schreber cannot refrain from retorting and his reply does not silence the voices. Neither the divine interventions nor Schreber’s own answers are subject to his individual control, which confirms Lacan’s idea that the psychotic is spoken rather than speaking.
这些讯息的第二个显著的特征是，许瑞伯必须补充他自己的部分，根据他对于这个符码的知识的基础：每一样开始东西都拥有它的合适的结尾。为了恢复它们的沟通的价值。用拉康的话来说，这些讯息是“幻觉的挑衅”。因为它们煽动并且强迫许瑞伯产生他所知道的东西。除外，许瑞伯无法控制不要去反驳。他的回答并没有让这些声音平息下来。无论是神性的介入，或是许瑞伯自己的回答，都没有隶属于他的个人的控制。这证实拉康的观念：精神病者正在被对谈，而不是言谈。
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